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(5) A product, or combination of products, referred to in paragraphs (1) through (4), even though the product, or combination of
products, is transferred between or among separate divisions, subsidiaries, or affiliates of a contractor.
(6) A nondevelopmental item if the procuring agency determines, in accordance with conditions in the Federal Acquisition Regulation,
that—
(A) the product was developed exclusively at private expense; and
(B) has been sold in substantial quantities, on a competitive basis, to multiple State and local governments or to multiple foreign
governments.
§ 103a. Commercial service
In this subtitle, the term “commercial service” means any of the following:
(1) Installation services, maintenance services, repair services, training services, and other services if—
(A) those services are procured for support of a commercial product, regardless of whether the services are provided by the same
source or at the same time as the commercial product; and
(B) the source of t e services provides similar services contemporaneously to the general public under terms and conditions similar to
th se offered to th Federal Governm nt;
(2) Services of a type offered and sold competitively, in substantial quantities, in the commercial marketplace—
(A) based on established catalog or market prices;
(B) for specific tasks performed or specific outcomes to be achieved; and
(C) under standard commercial terms and conditions.
(3) A service described in paragraph (1) or (2), even though the service is transferred between or among separate divisions, subsidiar-
ies, or affiliates of a contractor.
This change is purely semantic. It contains no substantive alterations to the requirements for qualifying as a commercial
product or service. To implement it, the NDAA revises the numerous other parts of the statutes that referred to “commercial
items.” We commend the Section 809 Panel and Congress for making this simple, but useful, semantics clarification. Clear
terminology is important. RCN
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Don’t look now, but a recent Government Accountability Office report suggests that, consistent with their popularity,
indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts are playing an increasingly dominant role in federal procurement. Defense
Contracting: Use by the Department of Defense of Indefinite-Delivery Contracts from Fiscal Years 2015 through 2017, GAO-
18-412R (May 10, 2018). See 60 GC ¶ 168.
This won’t surprise N&CR readers, many of whom have experienced this trend, on a transaction-by-transaction basis. In
June 2017, we described the GAO’s prior effort to chronicle the increasing popularity and growth of IDIQ contracts in a more
fulsome report, acknowledging that IDIQs “have become the procurement instrument of choice in a wide variety of situations.”
See Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contracts: A Popular Vehicle, 31 NCRNL ¶ 37, where we discussed Federal
Contracts: Agencies Widely Used Indefinite Contracts To Provide Flexibility To Meet Mission Needs, GAO-17-329 (Apr. 13,
2017). Our sense is that the numbers, and the upward trend, merit further examination.
We continue to believe that “[w]ith the heavy workload imposed on most contracting offices and the continual pressure to
minimize the number of contracting personnel, the IDIQ contract is here to stay,” 31 NCRNL ¶ 37. And we were not surprised
that the GAO described, as “stable,” the proportion of spending by federal agencies on IDIQ contracts—from fiscal years 2011
through 2015—at approximately a third of total Government contract obligations.
A Modest Increase, A Significant Percentage
In 31 NCRNL ¶ 37, we didn’t dwell on that one-third figure, even though closer examination of the GAO’s data showed a
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small decrease in IDIQ spending from 2011 to 2012, and then again from 2012 to 2013, before stabilizing from 2013 through
2015. At the time, the figure seemed reasonable to the extent that the Department of Defense’s reliance on IDIQs tracked the
Government-wide trend, with the GAO highlighting a decrease in DOD IDIQ spending from more than $125 billion in 2011, to
under $100 billion for 2013 through 2015.
Less than a year later, that stability appears more like a temporary plateau. In the May 2018 report (again, limited to the
DOD), the GAO explained that orders under indefinite-delivery contracts comprised roughly 40% of DOD obligations in FYs
2015 through 2017. During that brief three-year window, the DOD went from $89.1 billion in IDIQ spending in 2015 to more
than $105.6 billion in 2017—that’s an increase of more than 18%, which seems significant.
Regulations Do Not Reflect The New Normal
One of the most striking aspects of this phenomenon is how, over time, while procurement practices have evolved, the
regulatory rubric has failed to keep up. In other words, we find it remarkable how inadequately the Federal Acquisition Regula-
tion describes the process through which 40% of the DOD’s acquisition spending flows.
As most N&CR readers know, it wasn’t always this way. See Contract Types: There Are More Things in Heaven and Earth,
Judge, Than Are Dreamt of in the FAR, 32 NCRNL ¶ 3; What Rough Beast?: Basic Ordering Agreements—Innovation and
Confusion, 25 N&CR ¶ 62; BPAs vs. IDIQs: An Interesting Choice, 24 N&CR ¶ 26; and Postscript II: Blanket Purchase
Agreements, 23 N&CR ¶ 64. Today, a casual FAR reader (if there is such a person) would be hard pressed to intuit the current
role of IDIQs from the existing regulatory structure. Granted, the FAR wasn’t promulgated for casual readers. Still, the FAR
seems rather dramatically divorced from current IDIQ practice. For example, it seems strange that, in effect, the seemingly im-
penetrable and oft-challenged guidance in FAR 16.505 controls such a significant slice of the procurement pie. See, e.g.,
Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. U.S., 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016), 58 GC ¶ 227 (discussing, inter alia, “the distinction between
FSS orders and contracts”). This is by no means a unique problem within the FAR. As Vern noted in Get Rid of the Clutter:
“Streamline” the FAR, 31 N&CR ¶ 27, over three decades, “the FAR has grown. As it grows it becomes more unwieldy, and its
content seems to become murkier.” But, given the GAO’s findings, the lack of a regulatory big picture, roadmap, or structure
with regard to IDIQs seems like a big deal.
Let’s start at the beginning. FAR Part 2 suggests that the indefinite-delivery contract, “the procurement instrument of choice”
(as the GAO notes above), doesn’t even merit a standalone definition. (The only mentions of IDIQs in FAR Part 2 are found in
the context of interagency acquisition (under the definition of “direct acquisition”) and “multiple-award contract[s]” (which, as
discussed below, represent the minority of IDIQs, despite the FAR’s stated preference).) Conversely, “delivery order” and “task
order” are defined, and various flavors of “orders” fall under the definition of “contract” and receive treatment in the definitions
of “assisted acquisition,” “Governmentwide acquisition contract (GWAC),” “multi-agency contract (MAC),” and “multiple-
award contract.”
Similarly, the FAR buries—at FAR 8.004(a) —under the umbrella of “other sources” or places agencies could “consider” if
“mandatory sources” fail to satisfy the agency’s requirements—common IDIQ vehicles such as “Federal Supply Schedules,
Governmentwide acquisition contracts, multi-agency contracts, and any other procurement instruments intended for use by
multiple agencies, including blanket purchase agreements (BPAs) under Federal Supply Schedule contracts.”
Viewed from another perspective, FAR Subpart 16.1, “Selecting Contract Types,” makes no mention of IDIQs and, instead,
explains in FAR 16.101(b) that “contract types are grouped into two broad categories: fixed-price contracts (see [FAR] subpart
16.2) and cost-reimbursement contracts (see [FAR] subpart 16.3).” Similarly, FAR Part 16 plows through fixed-price contracts
(FAR Subpart 16.2), cost-reimbursement contracts (FAR Subpart 16.3), and even incentive contracts (FAR Subpart 16.4),
before turning to indefinite-delivery contracts (FAR Subpart 16.5). (As an aside, FAR Subpart 16.5 offers a basic introduction to
requirements contracts (FAR 16.503), but doesn’t pair them with output contracts as the does the Uniform Commercial Code—
UCC 2-306, “Output, Requirements and Exclusive Dealings.”) Granted, FAR Subpart 16.5 provides more guidance than RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, which barely acknowledges IDIQ contracts, primarily addressing the concepts in terms of
meeting the consideration requirement. See, e.g., the illustrations following § 77, “Illusory and Alternative Promises” and in of-
fers proposing a number or a series of contracts (§ 31). Nor does one find particularly helpful guidance in Defense FAR Supple-
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Planning is underway for the 2018 NASH & CIBINIC REPORT ROUNDTABLE—to
which subscribers are invited as our guests. The Roundtable is scheduled for
Thursday (8:30 A.M. to 5 P.M.) and Friday (8:30 a.m. to noon)—December 6 and
7, 2018—at the Almas Temple Conference Center, adjacent to the Hamilton
Hotel in Washington, D.C. At the ROUNDTABLE, NASH & CIBINIC REPORT author
Professor Ralph C. Nash, joined by contributing author Vernon J. Edwards and
distinguished experts, including contributing auth r Pr fessor Steven. L. Schoo-
ner, will conduct six separate 1½-hour sessions on pr curement topics of current
int rest. NASH & CIBINIC REPORT subscribers are e itled to send (a) one repr sen-
tative to the ROUNDTABLE at no charg a d (b) additional repres ntatives for a
specially di counted $400-per-person fee. The er-perso fee for nonsubscribers
is $800.Your Invitation to the ROUNDTABLE will be mailed to you later this month
in a separate envelope. Be sure to look for it.
COMPETITION & AWARD
¶ 39 POSTSCRIPT III: ELECTRONIC
BIDS AND PROPOSALS
Ralph C. Nash
It’s time to update our discussion of the late-is-late rule as it applies to
electronic proposals. See Electronic Bids and Proposals: The Absurd FAR Rule,
17 N&CR ¶ 10, and Pos scripts at 25 N&CR ¶ 28, and 27 N&CR ¶ 29. The
fundamental problem is that the Government Accountability Office and the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims are following differ nt reasoning with regard to the ap-
plication of the exceptions to the late proposal rule. These exceptions in
paragraph (c)(3)(ii)(A) of the Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.215-1 “Instruc-
tions to Offerors—Competitive Acquisition” solicitation provision read as
follows:
(1) If it was transmitted through an electronic commerce method authorized by
the solicitation, it was received at the initial point of entry to the Government
infrastructure not later than 5:00 p.m. one working day prior to the date specified for
receipt of proposals; or
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“Streamline” the FAR, 31 N&CR ¶ 27, over three decades, “the FAR has grown. As it grows it becomes more unwieldy, and its
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(as the GAO notes above), doesn’t even merit a standalone definition. (The only mentions of IDIQs in FAR Part 2 are found in
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order” are defined, and various flavors of “orders” fall under the definition of “contract” and receive treatment in the definitions
of “assisted acquisition,” “Governmentwide acquisition contract (GWAC),” “multi-agency contract (MAC),” and “multiple-
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Similarly, the FAR buries—at FAR 8.004(a) —under the umbrella of “other sources” or places agencies could “consider” if
“mandatory sources” fail to satisfy the agency’s requirements—common IDIQ vehicles such as “Federal Supply Schedules,
Governmentwide acquisition contracts, multi-agency contracts, and any other procurement instruments intended for use by
multiple agencies, including blanket purchase agreements (BPAs) under Federal Supply Schedule contracts.”
Viewed from another perspective, FAR Subpart 16.1, “Selecting Contract Types,” makes no mention of IDIQs and, instead,
explains in FAR 16.101(b) that “contract types are grouped into two broad categories: fixed-price contracts (see [FAR] subpart
16.2) and cost-reimbursement contracts (see [FAR] subpart 16.3).” Similarly, FAR Part 16 plows through fixed-price contracts
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before turning to indefinite-delivery contracts (FAR Subpart 16.5). (As an aside, FAR Subpart 16.5 offers a basic introduction to
requirements contracts (FAR 16.503), but doesn’t pair them with output contracts as the does the Uniform Commercial Code—
UCC 2-306, “Output, Requirements and Exclusive Dealings.”) Granted, FAR Subpart 16.5 provides more guidance than RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, which barely acknowledges IDIQ contracts, primarily addressing the concepts in terms of
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ment Subpart 216.5, “Indefinite-Delivery Contracts,” or PGI 216.1 (which merely references a DOD memorandum on incentive
contracts and some guidance on research and development contracts) or PGI 216.5 (which speaks only to ordering with regard
to exceptions to the fair opportunity process).
Despite ubiquitous use, the FAR suggests that, with regard to commercial purchasing, IDIQs are the exception, to the extent
they are introduced in FAR 12.207(b) and (c), which focuses disproportionately on the requirements for Contracting Officers to
execute a determination and findings (D&F). (Of course, FAR 12.207(c)(1) cross-references FAR Subpart 16.5, which brings us
full circle.)
In ter s of simplified procedures, FAR 13.003 only muddies the waters by clarifying that, while “[a]gencies shall use simpli-
fied acquisition procedures to the maximum extent practicable for all purchases of supplies or services not exceeding the simpli-
fied acquisition threshold,” that policy “does not apply if an agency can meet its requirement using…[e]xisting indefinite
delivery/indefinite quantity contracts.”
Single Awards Dominate Despite Regulatory Preference
All of which makes it all the more strange—in this day and age—that, once you find the relevant guidance on how IDIQs
actually work, FAR 16.500 leads by pointing out that “[t]his subpart…establishes a preference for making multiple awards of
indefinit -quantity contracts.” (Emphasis added.) FAR 16.504(c) then elaborates on the multiple award preference at length.
At which point the GAO’s recent report reminds us that policy and guidance, without teeth, are meaningless. The GAO notes
that, despite FAR 16.500(a)’s established preference for multiple awards, “[o]f the DOD awards for the indefinite-delivery
/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract type during this period, about three-quarters were made to a single contractor, rather than
multiple contractors.” (That implies only a slight increase from approximately 70% from the prior GAO report.) Elsewhere in
the report, the GAO indicated that “DOD obligated about two-thirds of its IDIQ contract obligations on single-award IDIQ
contracts.” (That implies only slight increase from approximately 60% from the prior GAO report.)
Either way, our sense is that, the reality that single awards comprise an amount between two-thirds (of the dollars projected
to flow through IDIQs) and three-quarters (of the IDIQ contracts) does not seem to reflect a “preference for multiple awards,”
and the trend line is owards less competition in IDIQs. Indeed, Table 1 in the re ort, below, suggests that the GAO under tate
the single-award trend; the T ble’s numbers of transactions indicated that sin le award IDIQs represen ed 79% of all DOD
IDIQs in 2015, 78% in 2016, a d whopping 85% in 20 7 (For FY 2017, that’s 6,242 single-award indefin t -delivery
contracts (tha were competed), 2,069 single-award indefinite-delivery contracts (that were not competed), and only ,423
multiple-award indefinite-delivery contracts.)
Nor should we expect that trend to reverse anytime soon. In a compelling recent example, in one of its highest profile pend-
ing solicitations, the DOD reminds us that the multiple award preference, in practice, is the exception, not the rule. On July 18,
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S) Ellen Lord signed a D&F providing authority to award to a
single source the DOD’s JEDI Cloud task order contract with a $10 billion maximum dollar value. See Solicitation Number:
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First, to the extent that IDIQ contracting is here to stay and represents such a significant percentage of the current procure-
ment landscape, Congress, the OFPP, the FAR Council, the Section 809 Panel, or all of the above, would be well served to put
some thought into reorganizing or redesigning the FAR—which, as stated in FAR 1.101, was “established for the codification
and publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies”—to better reflect modern practice.
(Of course, this is but one example of a topic with which the FAR has failed to keep pace. FAR Part 37, “Service Contracting,”
is every bit as antiquated and unhelpful, offering little helpful guidance, but maintaining the (now dead letter) prohibition on
personal services contracts, FAR 37.104 (see, e.g., Swan, Dead Letter Prohibitions and Policy Failures: Applying Government
Ethics Standards to Personal Services Contractors, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 668 (2012) (arguing “that the personal services pro-
hibition represents an outdated and inefficient method for protecting the government’s interest and should be abolished”) and
little known rules at FAR 37.116, intended to facilitate circulation of the $1 coin, which remains one of the most bizarre (albeit
not terribly burdensome) nuggets buried in the FAR.
Second, Congress or the FAR Council could raise the bar and mandate more meaningful impediments to single-award IDIQs,
whether in 10 USCA § 2304a(d)(4) and 41 USCA § 4103(d)(4), FAR Part 16, or elsewhere. The statutory mandate today offers
little more than a highly discretionary delegation to the FAR Council that “the regulations…establish a preference for awarding,
to the maximum extent practicable, multiple task or delivery order contracts…[and] establish criteria for determining when
award of multiple task or delivery order contracts would not be in the best interest of the Federal Government.” And decades of
experience demonstrate that general encouragement—even supplemented by memoranda (or D&F) drafting exercises—are not
going to change the marketplace’s behavior. Moreover, the GAO’s data suggest that doing so would be far more disruptive than
previously assumed, and we have no reason to think that the DOD or other agencies are sufficiently staffed to manage more
IDIQ contractors. Nor does it seem that Congress is particularly exercised about these trends, with legislative attention largely
drawn to task and delivery order bid protest rights (and thresholds).
Instead, maybe it’s time to jettison the stated preference for multiple awards. If 85% of the DOD’s IDIQs in FY 2017 were
single awards, the policy favoring multiple awards is teetering on the verge of dead letter. What’s worse, the GAO’s data sug-
gest that the primary result of the FAR’s multiple-award preference is subjecting CO’s to the seemingly pointless exercise of
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HQ003418R0077_JEDI_CLOUD_RFP on https://www.fbo.gov/. Oracle promptly protested to the GAO, asserting, among
other things, that:
DoD’s single awardee IDIQ contract approach is contrary to statutory and regulatory requirements; contrary to the perspective of
numerous industry experts that a multi-vendor IDIQ contract offers the most advantageous approach for DoD’s near term and long term
technology requirements; contrary to the market trend toward multi-cloud environments; and contrary to DoD’s own stated objectives of
flexibility, innovation, a broad industrial base, and keeping pace with evolving technology.
Also available on https://www.fbo.gov/. Lord’s D&F appears entirely consistent with her stated emphasis on speed, rather than
bureaucracy, control, or regulation. See, e.g., Memorandum from Under Sec’y of Defense (A&S), Middle Tier of Acquisition
(Rapid Prototyping/Rapid Fielding) Interim Authority and Guidance (Apr. 16, 2018), http://acqnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/OSD-Middle-Tier-of-Acquisition-Interim-Authority-and-Guidance-16-Apr-2018..pdf (authorizing “a new pathway,
distinct from the traditional acquisition system”); Ellen M. Lord, Current State of Defense Acquisition and Associated Reforms,
Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Lo
rd_12-07-17.pdf (planning to reduce, by 50%, the typical lead time from requirement until awarding a major weapon systems
contract; leveraging nontraditional contracting tools, including “other transactions”).
As has become practice, the DOD is merely following the rules in papering over avoidance of the stated multiple-award
policy. By way of explanation, the GAO elaborates, in footnote 1:
With limited exceptions, the FAR requires contracting officers, to the maximum extent practicable, to give preference to making multiple
awards of IDIQ contracts.… However, the FAR also establishes that there are times where contacting officers must not use the multiple
award approach—including when it is not in the best interest of the government.
The GAO’s data suggests that procuring agencies have concluded—and behaved consistent with their belief that—the stated
preference for a multiple award approach is not in the best interest of the Government. The GAO explained that, while many of
the solicitations that led to these contracts “contemplated competition among the contract holders for subsequent orders”
extraneous considerations ultimately derailed any such competition. The bottom line remains: “nearly all of the contracts [that
the GAO] reviewed contained provisions that, while not explicitly limiting competition, may have the potential, under certain
circumstances, to reduce the number of contractors…eligible to compete for the orders. Generally, these provisions were in ser-
vice of some other goal, such as increasing federal contracting opportunities for small businesses by setting aside certain task or
delivery order competitions among these firms.” (Emphasis added.)
This reminds us of former Office of Federal Procurement Policy administrator Steve Kelman’s failed “Mayflower Compact”
effort. As Steve explains, we saw this coming.
[I]n early 1997, as I was nearing the end of my tenure [at OFPP, I became]… concerned that government contractors, in pursuit of
advantage over competitors, might allow customers to ignore the simple rules established for streamlined competition for orders and ac-
cept business from those [prefer]ing sole-source buys.… I repeatedly urged GWAC/[General Services Administration] managers to es-
tablish a Mayflower Compact. The name alluded to the agreement the Pilgrims had set up among themselves to enforce laws in their new,
governmentless land.
My idea was that this world of new vehicles was like the new world to which the colonists had come, and managers of these vehicles
needed to agree among themselves to enforce constraints that established the context in which they competed against one another.
However, with GWACs/GSA flush with revenues, the Mayflower Compact was never broadly adopted.
Kelman, The Mayflower Revisited, FCW (June 14, 2004), https://fcw.com/articles/2004/06/14/kelman-the-mayflower-revisited.
aspx. It didn’t work then, and it’s not working now. Instead, IDIQ vehicles became “hunting licenses.” See Competition for
Task Orders: The Exception or the Rule?, 18 N&CR ¶ 42; Postscript: Multiple Award Schedules, 12 N&CR ¶ 3. See also
Palmer, The Cost of Convenience, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE (Mar. 1, 2006), https://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2006/
03/the-cost-of-convenience/21281/. And both Government buyers and private sector sellers repeatedly demonstrate that they
prefer single vendors to the competition (either meaningful or formalistic) inherent in multiple awards.
What To Make Of All This
The GAO’s report is admittedly descriptive and, indeed, the GAO concedes that it was making no recommendations in its
report. That’s a shame. We can think of two recommendations that follow logically from the GAO’s research.
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ment Subpart 216.5, “Indefinite-Delivery Contracts,” or PGI 216.1 (which merely references a DOD memorandum on incentive
contracts and some guidance on research and development contracts) or PGI 216.5 (which speaks only to ordering with regard
to exceptions to the fair opportunity process).
Despite ubiquitous use, th FAR suggests that, with regard to commercial purchasing, IDIQs are the exce tion, to the extent
they are introduce in FAR 12.207(b) and (c), which focuses disproportio ately on the requirements for Co tracti g Officers to
execute a determination and findings (D&F). (Of course, FAR 12.207(c)(1) cross-references FAR Subpart 16.5, which brings us
full circle.)
In terms of simplified procedures, FAR 13.003 only muddies the waters by clarifying that, while “[a]gencies shall use simpli-
fied acquisition procedures to the maximum extent practicable for all purchases of supplies or services not exceeding the simpli-
fied acquisition threshold,” that policy “does not apply if an agency can meet its requirement using…[e]xisting indefinite
delivery/indefinite quantity contracts.”
Single Awards Dominate Despite Regulatory Preference
All of which makes it all the more strange—in this day and age—that, once you find the relevant guidance on how IDIQs
actually work, FAR 16.500 leads by pointing out that “[t]his subpart…establishes a preference for making multiple awards of
indefinite-quantity contracts.” (Emphasis added.) FAR 16.504(c) then elaborates on the multiple award preference at length.
At wh ch point the GAO’s recent report reminds us th t policy and guid nce, wit out teeth, are m aningless. The GAO notes
that, d spite FAR 16.500(a)’s es ablished preference for ul iple awards, “[o]f the DOD awards for the indefinite-delivery
/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract type during t s period, about three-quarters were made to single contractor, rather tha
multiple contractors.” (That implies nly a slight increase from approximately 70% from the prior GAO eport.) Els where in
the report, the GAO indicated that “DOD oblig ted about tw -thi ds of its IDIQ contract obligations on single-award IDIQ
contracts.” (That impl es only a slight increase from approximat ly 60% from the prior GAO report.)
Eithe way, our sense is that, the reality th t single awards comprise a amount between two-thirds (of the d llars projected
to flow through IDIQs) and three-quarters (of the IDIQ contracts) does not seem to reflect a “preference for multiple awards,”
and the trend line is towards less competition in IDIQs. Indeed, Table 1 in the report, below, suggests that the GAO understated
the single-award trend; the Table’s numbers of transactions indicated that single award IDIQs represented 79% of all DOD
IDIQs in 2015, 78% in 2016, a d a wh pping 85% in 2017. (For FY 2017, that’s 6,242 single-award i defi it -delivery
contracts (that were co peted), 2,069 single-award indefinite-delivery contracts (that were not competed), and only 1,423
multiple-award indefinite-delivery contracts.)
Nor should we expect that trend to reverse anytime soon. In a compelling recent example, in one of its highest profile pend-
ing solicitations, the DOD reminds us that the multiple award preference, in practice, is the exception, not the rule. On July 18,
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S) Ellen Lord signed a D&F providing authority to award to a
single source the DOD’s JEDI Cloud task order contract with a $10 billion maximum dollar value. See Solicitation Number:
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First, to the extent that IDIQ contracting is here to stay and represents such a significant percentage of the current procure-
ment landscape, Congress, the OFPP, the FAR Council, the Section 809 Panel, or all of the above, would be well served to put
some thought into reorganizing or redesigning the FAR—which, as stated in FAR 1.101, was “established for the codification
and publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies”—to better reflect modern practice.
(Of course, this is but one example of a topic with which the FAR has failed to keep pace. FAR Part 37, “Service Contracting,”
is every bit as antiquated and unhelpful, offering little helpful guidance, but maintaining the (now dead letter) prohibition on
personal services contracts, FAR 37.104 (see, e.g., Swan, Dead Letter Prohibitions and Policy Failures: Applying Government
Ethics Standards to Personal Services Contractors, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 668 (2012) (arguing “that the personal services pro-
hibition represents an outdated and inefficient method for protecting the government’s interest and should be abolished”) and
little known rules at FAR 37.116, intended to facilitate circulation of the $1 coin, which remains one of the most bizarre (albeit
not terribly burdensome) nuggets buried in the FAR.
Second, Congress or the FAR Council could raise the bar and mandate more meaningful impediments to single-award IDIQs,
whether in 10 USCA § 2304a(d)(4) and 41 USCA § 4103(d)(4), FAR Part 16, or elsewhere. The statutory mandate today offers
little more than a highly discretionary delegation to the FAR Council that “the regulations…establish a preference for awarding,
to the maximum extent practicable, multiple task or delivery order contracts…[and] establish criteria for determining when
award of multiple task or delivery order contracts would not be in the best interest of the Federal Government.” And decades of
experience demonstrate that general encouragement—even supplemented by memoranda (or D&F) drafting exercises—are not
going to change the marketplace’s behavior. Moreover, the GAO’s data suggest that doing so would be far more disruptive than
previously assumed, and we have no reason to think that the DOD or other agencies are sufficiently staffed to manage more
IDIQ contractors. Nor does it seem that Congress is particularly exercised about these trends, with legislative attention largely
drawn to task and delivery order bid protest rights (and thresholds).
Instead, maybe it’s time to jettison the stated preference for multiple awards. If 85% of the DOD’s IDIQs in FY 2017 were
single awards, the policy favoring multiple awards is teetering on the verge of dead letter. What’s worse, the GAO’s data sug-
gest that the primary result of the FAR’s multiple-award preference is subjecting CO’s to the seemingly pointless exercise of
generating D&Fs. We think that the DOD’s 1102s had better things to do with their time in FY 2017 than generate 8,300 D&Fs,
and the time they did spend was “time that [wa]s not devoted to the central function and goal of acquisition,” as noted in Petty
Rules: The Friction in the System, 31 NCRNL ¶ 68 (although Vern’s example there is not a perfect analogy). Nor do we think
that churning out this type of formalistic paperwork enhances job satisfaction. Human behavior suggests that widely ignored
mandates and polices breed cynicism, and that cynicism bleeds over to other (arguably more important) mandates. Maybe this
aspiration—however well intentioned—has outlived its usefulness. SLS
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